In the first study using British data, we show that the ethnic earnings gap among performance pay jobs is smaller on average than that among time rate jobs. Moreover, quantile estimates and decompositions show that this narrowing is driven by bonus payments in the upper middle portion of the earnings distribution. The results partially reflect sorting in which the more able take performance pay jobs but the results persist with diminished magnitude in fixed effect estimates. These findings differ dramatically from those for the United States in which performance pay has been associated with larger negative racial differentials especially at the top of the earnings distribution.
INTRODUCTION
Performance pay mitigates inherent agency problems in labour contracts by linking worker compensation to worker performance. While this link generates greater wage dispersion within the firm (Lazear 2000) , it may also influence the broader earnings distribution. Lemieux et al. (2009) argue that performance pay provides an important mechanism for translating differences in skills into differences in earnings. They show that performance pay stretches out the US earnings distribution. Yet, Heywood and Parent (2012) demonstrate that this is unique to white workers. Performance pay does not stretch out the top of the black distribution as it does for the white distribution. As a consequence, the racial earnings gap is larger in the performance pay sector and especially so at the top of the earnings distribution.
The recognition that performance pay may influence racial and ethnic earnings differences has been developed in a series of North American based studies but we provide the first examination of its influence in Britain. We estimate the relative ethnic earnings gap in performance pay jobs and in time rate jobs. We draw data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which identifies performance pay and provides detailed information on employees' personal and parental characteristics as well as on job characteristics and work conditions. We observe two measures of performance pay: performance related pay and bonuses. Further, the panel element of the data allows us to remove time invariant unobserved worker heterogeneity.
The British results differ substantially from those presented for the United States.
First, performance pay (and especially bonuses) is associated with narrower rather than expanded ethnic average wage differentials. Second, while this association with smaller differentials varies over the wage distribution, quantile decompositions make clear there is no evidence that performance pay expands differentials at the top of the earnings distribution. Indeed, the racial earnings gap actually turns modestly positive (in favour of minorities) at the top of the earnings distribution and the largest contribution by bonuses to improving the relative position of minorities is in the upper middle portion of the distribution.
We find evidence of sorting as individual fixed effect estimates are smaller in magnitude. Nonetheless, bonuses continue to be associated with smaller ethnic earnings differentials even in the fixed effect estimates. We examine the observables associated with the sorting and show that it is the more educated and those minority groups typically associated with labour market success that move into bonus jobs.
There appears to be heterogeneity in the pattern of results. The relatively smaller differential is associated with bonuses but not with performance related pay. Moreover the smaller differential associated with bonuses appears somewhat more prominently for Asians than for Blacks although our sample size limits the precision of estimates. In the end, we identify a differentiated pattern of results unique to Britain that emphasize the contrast with the US. We find little evidence that performance pay is driving larger ethnic earnings differences in Britain or that ethnic minorities select away from performance pay or that the influence of performance pay is particularly adverse to minorities at the top of the distribution as suggested in the North American studies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on the underlying theoretical conjectures, the North American evidence and the British context. Section 3 presents the data and reports descriptive analysis. Section 4 describes the estimation methodology and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 summarizes the findings and suggests future research.
BACKGROUND
There exist conflicting theories about the influence of performance pay on racial and ethnic wage differentials. Heywood and O'Halloran (2005) present a model in which objective based performance pay such as piece rates or commissions provide information to all workers and potential enforcement officials about the pay and productivity of each worker. This information makes it more likely that a discriminating employer would be detected, and face financial penalties. In turn, this reduces the incentive to discriminate suggesting that performance pay should be associated with reduced measured earnings differentials. Alternatively, performance pay is often set based on a managerial appraisal in which there may be large elements of subjectivity (MacLeod 2003) . This subjectivity increases the latitude for managers who set, for example, the bonuses of their subordinates. As a consequence, the presence of performance pay may facilitate earnings set in accordance with the objective functions of managers rather than in accordance with profit maximization (Becker 1971) . In their theoretical modeling, Meon and Szafarz (2011) show that in the face of agency problems between owners and managers, performance pay will not eliminate discrimination calling the modern corporation "a safe haven for taste-based discrimination".
In seeming accord with this distinction between formulaic and subjective bonuses, Heywood and O'Halloran (2005; use the US National Longitudinal Survey to show that while measured racial wage differentials are significantly smaller among those paid objective piece rates than among those paid time rates, they are actually largest among those paid subjective bonuses. Elvira and Town (2001) confirm that supervisors' performance appraisals are influenced by the race of their subordinates. A White supervisor typically gives non-White subordinates worse ratings even when holding constant all other demographic variables and available (to the researcher) objective measures of productivity. This raises the possibility that equally productive Black and White workers are paid differently but have supervisory evaluations that support the differences. Castilla (2008; 2012) also uses US data going further to show not only that race influences appraisal ratings but that Blacks receive smaller raises than Whites even with equal ratings. Canadian evidence shows a substantial ethnic earnings gap among those on time rates which include bonuses but no evidence of an ethnic earnings gap among those receiving formulaic performance pay: tips, commissions or piece rates (Fang and Heywood
2006).
While there may be a difference between subjective and formulaic performance pay, this difference may not always determine the extent of discrimination. Bureaucratic rules or reputation concerns may limit discrimination in subjective schemes (Prendergast and Topel 1993) and objective schemes may be manipulated to reflect managerial preferences. Thus, Madden (2008) uses data from two large US financial service firms to show that the size of stockbrokers' formulaic bonuses depends critically on "complementary inputs" provided by managers (such as the quality of the accounts managers distribute to brokers). She shows that differences in these complementary inputs, rather than differences in success with otherwise equal inputs, explain the lower earnings of female stock brokers who have male managers. Heywood and Parent (2012) return to the issue of the influence of performance pay on racial wage differences with special attention paid to the distributional aspects. They use the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics and show that in the time rate sector the Black-White earnings differential shrinks when moving up the earnings distribution. On the other hand, in the performance pay sector the Black-White earnings differential grows when moving up the earnings distribution and explodes at the very top of the distribution.
The authors highlight two potential explanations. Unmeasured ability at the top of the performance pay distribution may be greater for whites than for blacks and if measured might explain the large differential. Alternatively, the top of the performance pay distribution may be dominated by subjective evaluation schemes increasing the latitude for discrimination. While unable to distinguish between these explanations, the evidence of sorting was clear with high ability blacks tending to sort out of performance pay schemes as high ability whites tended to sort into performance pay schemes.
Despite the policy importance of earnings differentials in many countries and the growth of performance pay in the labour markets of many countries, the vast majority of the empirical literature stems from North America.
1 In particular, we know of no corresponding study for Britain. Yet, such a study seems called for.
Both British academics and policy makers remain concerned about the relative labor market position of ethnic minorities and the causes of that relative position (see the report of the National Equality Panel, 2010). One measure of this relative position is the ethnic earnings differential which we investigate. It is widely accepted that ethnic earnings differentials have declined far less than gender differentials over the period since the equal opportunities legislation were introduced in Britain starting with the Race Relations Act of 1965. Indeed, ethnic minorities have become increasingly concentrated in the lower percentiles of the pay distribution (Bell 1997; Blackaby et al. 1994; 2002) . Numerous studies have also found evidence of more limited employment prospects and wages (Clark and Drinkwater, 2009; Dustmann and Theodoropoulos, 2010) , fewer training and promotion opportunities (Pudney and Shields, 2000) and lower occupational attainment 6 (Stewart, 1983) for ethnic minority groups compared to similar white natives. Specifically, (Blackaby et al. 1998; 2002) Graham et al. 2007) . The increased attention paid to performance pay by both academics and policymakers is driven by the view that it has the potential to make earnings more closely correspond with productivity. Yet, the consequences of greater use of performance pay on ethnic labor market outcomes have not been given sufficient consideration. We now turn our effort to providing this consideration.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We draw data from the BHPS which has been frequently used for exploring performance pay issues (see for instance Booth and Frank, 1999; Green and Heywood, 2008 wage differentials. More detailed information on scheme characteristics might allow a more nuanced view but is unavailable in the BHPS. We initially combine the indicators into a single category (they are not mutually exclusive) and then break them out separately in our examination.
We limit our sample to all male workers aged 16 to 65 who are British private sector employees. 5 To further increase homogeneity and make comparisons of wages more clear cut, we exclude the self-employed. Indeed, the measures of performance pay are essentially defined only for the employed. This yields a total of 25,841 annual observations across the eight waves. While the self-employed might be seen as receiving the ultimate form of performance pay, including them moves away from our focus on the employment relationship and concerns with labour market discrimination. 6 Moreover, the earnings of the self-employed are difficult to reconcile with those of the employed as much of their earnings appear not as labour income but as retained profits.
The BHPS contains relatively detailed information on ethnicity. Individuals provide responses including "black" ethnicities (i.e. black-Caribbean, black-African) and "Asian" ethnicities (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese) and other non-white ethnicities. In our primary analysis we contrast workers who identify as white with all those who identify as non-white. 7 We appreciate that this categorisation is broad and contains much heterogeneity (see for instance Longhi et al. 2013 and Blackaby et al. 2002) but it is driven by the sample size and the desire to gain more precise estimates. As a consequence, our primary estimates represent aggregate ethnic differences. Nonetheless, we do provide more disaggregated robustness checks. Moreover, in recognition of the relatively small number of minority observations, our decomposition methodology reweights the characteristics of whites to match those of ethnic minorities as described in the next section.
The BHPS contains a variety of wage and income variables. In order to best match with the bonus question we use the measure of annual labour income. The alternative of using the earnings in the last pay period likely excludes low frequency performance pay receipt. We use the log of annual earnings as the dependent variable and control for total hours worked which is the product of usual weekly hours (including overtime) and the weeks worked in the year. Annual earnings are deflated to a 2005 base year using the CPI.
INSERT (2010) and Dustmann et al. (2011) . The sample has a smaller proportion of non-white observations (3%), compared to for instance Dustmann et al. 2011 (Figure 15 .1) who report that 4-5% of the working age population over the 1998-2008 period are from ethnic minorities. This may reflect our focus on private sector employees (i.e. not public or self-employed) and the oversampling of Scotland and Wales in the BHPS. In our single equation estimates we use sample weights as robustness checks and in the subsequent decompositions we reweight our white worker distribution to match that of non-whites (more details further). We find no evidence that our pattern of results is driven by the under-sampling of minorities in the BHPS.
INSERT TABLE 2   Table 2 presents the prevalence of the two payment methods across the earnings distribution separately for Whites and ethnic minorities. Bonuses are more common than performance related pay. The incidence of bonuses increases when moving up the earnings distribution for both Whites and minorities. The increase is steeper for minorities with the incidence for minorities starting well below that of Whites but ending above that of Whites at the top of the distribution. As the incidence of performance pay differs substantially across the distribution, it makes sense to explore its influence on earnings across the distribution as well.
INSERT 
ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
The initial results will be single equation log-linear estimates using typical earnings determinants including the performance pay variables. These focus on the difference in ethnic differentials using interactions with the payment variables:
Here the time element has been suppressed but accounted for in the estimation by year dummies and standard errors that are clustered by individual. In these pooled estimates the coefficient indicates any differential return to performance pay, PP, by ethnic status, E. These pooled estimates will be supplemented by otherwise similar single equation fixed effect estimates that cause E to drop out as invariant but allow estimation of and from the within worker variation in performance pay. Yet, much of our interest is how the racial differential may be influenced by performance pay at different parts of the earnings distribution. The concern is that estimates at the average may hide a different influence at the top of the distribution as found in the US. Thus, we present single equation (ethnic and white workers together) quantile estimates that mimic the interaction specification above. 
Where is the density and 1( ) indicates that the earnings observation is at or above the quantile q(τ). It is recentered as is added and as a consequence, the expected value of the RIF will be itself. Indeed, Firpo et al. (2009) show this property extends to the conditional-on-controls RIF. In practice, the estimation of on the observables becomes a variation on the linear probability model of whether the observed earnings exceed the quantile of interest. The variation is merely that the coefficients are divided by the density evaluated at that quantile.
Thus, while one cannot directly decompose the earnings gap at , say the median earnings for ethnic minorities, one can decompose the probability gap by estimating linear probability models that first minorities and then whites are above the minority median earnings. The technique exploits the fact that the earnings gap and the probability gap are ratios of each other with the ratio being the slope of the cumulative distribution function, the density. So imagine the earnings gap (minority minus white) at quantile :
The technique then uses a reweighting methodology (DiNardo et al. 1996) to construct a counterfactual wage distribution, the distribution of earnings for white workers if they had the same distribution of observables as minorities. This generates the counterfactual earnings and allows decomposing the quantile earnings gap:
The first term gives the portion of the quantile wage gap due to the difference in returns as the distribution of observables is constant. This is the unexplained portion of the gap. The second term gives the portion of the quantile earnings gap due to differences in the composition as the earnings structure is the same. This is the explained portion of the gap.
The RIF regressions allocate the difference due to return and to composition among the individual covariates including performance pay. Thus, for each quantile three separate RIF regression are estimated for , for and for . Following this, the usual Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is performed on each of the two portions of the gap. Specifically for our purposes this provides the portion of the explained difference at any quantile that is attributable to differences in performance pay prevalence and the portion of the unexplained difference at any quantile attributable to differences in the return to performance pay.
We emphasize that the wage distribution of white workers is reweighted to make it similar to that of non-whites using the method in DiNardo et al. (1996) . We do not perform the reverse exercise of reweighting the non-white distribution to make it look like the white distribution. Although equally reasonable in theory, the relatively small sample size of the minorities suggests we could face a common support problem. While it is not difficult to find white workers comparable to nonwhites at any point of support in the distribution of observables for nonwhites, it is more difficult to find non-white workers who are comparable to whites. Reweighting in this fashion helps control for the possibility that the distribution of observables for whites and non-whites could be profoundly different (Fortin et al. 2011 ).
Finally, after examining the decomposition across the earnings distribution we return to fixed effect estimates and provide quantile fixed effect results. While not allowing the decomposition, these allow us to explore whether the pattern we isolate in the earlier quantile estimates differs when holding constant worker fixed effects. In the end, the picture painted by exploring this wide variety of distributional issues will be broadly consistent in pointing out the importance of bonuses in providing larger returns to minorities and that this influence appears to be concentrated in the upper middle portion of the distribution. INSERT TABLE 4 Looking at Column 1, nonwhites not in performance pay jobs face an earnings penalty of 21.6 percent while those in performance pay jobs face a significantly smaller earnings penalty of 11.0 percent. 9 Alternatively, for whites performance pay is associated with 12.1 percent higher earnings while for nonwhites it is associated with 27.1 percent higher earnings. Thus, the initial estimates suggest that performance pay may help close the ethnic earnings gap by increasing the earnings of minorities more than those of whites.
Results
Our performance pay measure puts together PRP and bonuses. The third column disaggregates these into two indicators. The estimated results show that the pattern in the first column is driven by bonuses. There is a large and highly significant interaction indicating that the measured ethnic earnings gap is smaller among those receiving bonuses. On the other hand, the interaction of ethnic status with PRP is both insignificant and small. In what follows, we will continue to consider PRP but much of the attention will be on the indicator of bonuses.
While we have included hours as an independent variable, the pattern is not a function of that choice. We created a measure of hourly wages that takes the actual earnings and dividing by the hours worked. Using this imputed wage measure, the results appear largely unchanged with a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction of bonuses and ethnic minority status. We retain our specification as it is inherently more flexible. We also note that estimates using population weights do not materially change these results and are available from the authors.
A key issue is that workers are not randomly assigned into performance pay jobs.
Thus, what appears to be a differential attributable to performance pay may instead reflect workers with greater unobserved ability sorting into performance pay jobs (Lazear 2000).
The measured return to performance pay reflects the unmeasured characteristics of the workers who sort into performance pay. The first order treatment for such unmeasured characteristics is to estimate a fixed effects model that holds constant time invariant worker specific earnings determinants. At issue is whether or not the greater return to performance pay for ethnic minorities reflects greater unmeasured ability among those minorities that sort into performance pay jobs.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 report these fixed effect estimates. Only those respondents who change payment method identify the estimates. As there is no change in minority status, this and other unchanging characteristics play no role in the estimate.
Nonetheless, we can identify the influence of performance pay on earnings separately for Whites and ethnic minorities even though we will be unable to identify a direct ethnic minority wage gap. Column 2 of Table 4 shows that the coefficient on output pay remains statistically significant but shrinks. When accounting for the time invariant fixed effects, the coefficient implies a 5.2 percent increase in earnings associated with performance pay which is roughly half of that implied by the pooled estimate. The coefficient on the interaction remains statistically significant suggesting a difference by ethnicity in the premium associated with performance pay. The sum of the coefficients suggests that for minorities the return to performance pay is 13.9 percent. The fourth column separates the two pay components revealing again that the difference in returns to performance pay is driven by a significant interaction for bonuses but not for performance related pay which takes an insignificant coefficient. 10 It is well recognized that panel estimates of this sort increase the role of measurement error and that increased standard errors can be the cause of a lack of statistical significance (Solon 1985) . There is some evidence of this as the standard error is much larger in the fixed effect estimates. Nonetheless, the pattern and basic significance remains.
Before moving to the distributional analysis, we describe our efforts to examine heterogeneity by ethnic group. We focus on three non-white ethnicities: Asian, Black and other nonwhites. 11 We reproduce the estimates from Table 4 now replacing the single non-white indicator with these three group indicators and their interactions with the performance pay variables. Column 1 of Appendix Table 1 shows the pooled estimates with Asians and other nonwhites having virtually identical negative significant differentials but with blacks earning the same as whites. The interactions suggest that both Asians and other nonwhites receive larger returns to bonuses than do whites. Indeed, the differential return is so large for Asians that it eliminates the ethnic differential. There appear to be no significant differences in returns to PRP by ethnicity. The second column of Table A1 reproduces the fixed effect estimate with the disaggregated ethnic categories and shows fewer significant differences. While bonuses continue to be associated with higher earnings, PRP becomes insignificant. Moreover, although the interactions on bonus pay and three ethnic categories remain positive, both Asian and Black are now insignificantly different from zero. The only observed difference is a weakly significant difference for other non-Whites suggesting that their return to bonuses may be larger than that of whites.
We recognize the heterogeneity of ethnicity even within the groups we have broken out. Longhi et al. (2013) demonstrate marked variation among Asians in labour market performance by detailed ethnicity, religion and whether they are first or second generation. Our data are not sufficient to precisely estimate such differences and as a consequence we continue to present only broad differences between whites and nonwhites as we move into our distributional analysis.
Distributional Differences
In the US it has been claimed that the negative racial wage differential shrinks for those at the top of distribution who have more education and training (Lang 2007 As a consequence, this shows the opposite of the US pattern of performance pay increasing differentials at the top of the distribution. Instead, ethnic minorities receive essentially a similar differential return on bonuses over whites throughout most of the distribution.
INSERT TABLE 5 The quantile regressions indicate three further patterns of interest. First, at the top of the distribution, the ethnic differential has shrunk sufficiently that while still statistically significant for those earning time rates it is non-existent for those receiving bonuses (the sum of the coefficients on ethnicity and its bonus interaction). Second, in the lower half of the earnings distribution minorities receive a significantly lower return on performance related pay. Alternatively, ethnic wage differentials are larger for those in the lower half of the distribution who receive performance related pay than for those who receive time rates. Third, the return on bonuses itself seems to attenuate as one moves up the distribution even as the interaction with minority status does not.
As we suggested in our methodology section, the structure of the estimates so far limits the coefficients on every variable except performance pay to be identical for ethnic minorities and whites. This is known not to be the case and likely causes bias to the estimated interactions. Table 6 presents the estimates of the Firpo et al. (2009) quantile decomposition. In each case the quantile wage gap is divided into an explained and unexplained portion and those portions can be further assigned to each specific covariate.
While the full estimation is available from the authors, we have highlighted the results 20 critical to our interest. The first row shows the full predicted ethnic earnings differential at each quantile. The next two rows show the total explained and unexplained portion of that differential, that due to differences in characteristics and due to differences in returns to characteristics. The next two rows show the portion of the explained and unexplained differences that are attributable to each of the two performance pay variables.
INSERT TABLE 6 The results indicate large total unadjusted negative ethnic earnings differentials at the bottom of the distribution. These shrink and eventually turn positive at the top of the distribution. At the 10th percentile the unadjusted differential is over 0.4 log points and it is, in aggregate, almost entirely unexplained by differences in observables. The differences in the incidence of performance related pay plays a very small but statistically significant role in providing explanation. If minorities and white had the same incidence of performance related pay the observed earnings gap would close very slightly. This will emerge as a general finding throughout the distribution. Neither of the payment variables contributes significantly to the very large unexplained differential at the 10 th percentile.
While the portion due to the difference in coefficients on bonuses is relatively large it misses statistical significance at the 10% level.
The 25 th percentile reveals a pattern that persists throughout the remainder of the distribution. The unexplained differential is more negative than the unadjusted differential.
Thus, controlling for observables implies a larger earnings disadvantage to ethnic minorities than that actually observed. This mimics the findings of Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010) . At the median, the unexplained differential is attributable partly to differences in the returns to payment methods. The influence associated with the two variables approximately offset each other. With differences in returns to performance related pay making the differential larger (more negative) and differences in returns to bonuses making the differential smaller (less negative).
The influence of the returns to bonuses becomes more dramatic in the 75 th percentile. The overall unadjusted differential is now essentially zero but is composed of roughly offsetting explained and unexplained portions. Critically, the negative unexplained differential includes the now large positive influence from the difference in returns to bonuses. Indeed, the size of the bonus influence is such that if it did not exist the overall unexplained difference would be twice as large (more negative). The role of differences in returns to performance related pay evident at the median has now vanished. Overall, the evidence provides greater richness to our earlier estimates by indicating that the larger returns that minorities receive to bonuses significantly reduces the adjusted minority earnings gap in this portion of the distribution.
Finally, at the 90 th percentile, the unexplained minority earnings differential vanishes and the higher earnings of ethnic minorities are completely explained by the observables. Again, in the 50 th and 75 th percentiles the difference in returns to bonuses narrows the unexplained ethnic minority earnings gap. As a consequence, allowing for separate earnings regimes for minorities and whites continues to reveal an influence for bonuses in closing the gap although perhaps not as uniformly as suggested by single equation methods. Moreover, it continues to provide no indication that performance pay causes the unexplained earnings gap to expand at the top of the distribution.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Repeating the exercise from Table 6 at every five percentage point quantile allows us to more fully chart the distributional implications in Figure 1 Again, a concern may be that the differences apparent in the quantile regressions reflect differences in unobserved worker productivity across pay types and across the distribution. To examine this one could include a worker specific shift for each individual for every quantile. This might be termed a conditional (on the quantile) fixed effects quantile model. However, as discussed by Koenker (2004) INSERT TABLE 7 Table 7 shows the fixed effect quantile estimates and presents similarities with and differences from the patterns without the fixed effects. First, it continues to be the case that bonus receipt remains a significant positive determinant of earnings throughout the distribution and that the magnitude of the coefficient clearly declines at the top of the distribution. As anticipated, the magnitude of the fixed effect coefficients is typically smaller than those without fixed effects. Second, the fixed effect estimate of the coefficient on the interaction of bonus with minority status remains positive but grows over the distribution and is significant only at the 75 th and 90 th percentile. This pattern of the interaction concentrated at the top of the distribution was not evident in the quantile estimates without fixed effects (Table 5 ) but was at least partially reflected in the decompositions which emphasised the 60 th to 85 th percentile. The fixed effect result continues to differ from the evidence on US black-white earnings differences. Heywood and Parent (2012) show blacks on performance pay doing increasingly worse relative to their whites at the top of the earnings distribution. As a consequence, more able blacks sort out of performance pay. Our results suggest that bonuses improve the relative earnings of ethnic minorities in the upper or at least upper-middle portion of the distribution. Thus, our implication for Britain would seemingly be the opposite: more able ethnic minorities should sort into bonuses. We will explore this finding before concluding.
We emphasize that the patterns we show are not dependent upon our particular choice of independent variables or our particular choice of how to trim the sample. In robustness exercises we have added educational levels of the respondent's parents, whether or not the respondent is foreign born, self-perception of being overweight (as proxy for non-cognitive skills) and being paid by the hour. 12 None of these alter the basic results. Similarly, we have excluded the top and bottom one percent of respondents in the hours of work distribution and also eliminated all workers less than 25 years of age.
Neither modification materially changes the results.
While we obviously cannot identify all the components that drive sorting, we can compare the composition of the sectors by observables. Table A2 presents two probit estimates showing marginal effects on the probability of receiving a bonus. The first is for Whites and the second is for non-whites. These are not meant to imply causation but rather simply document the patterns of sorting across the observables.
Comparing the estimates suggests differential ability sorting. The influence of possessing a university degree or more is nearly five times larger for ethnic minorities.
Thus, highly educated minorities are more likely to sort into bonus jobs. Managers and supervisors who are minorities are also more likely to sort (or be sorted) into bonus jobs.
Expanding the estimates to include the unique indicators available in the BHPS reveals that parental education also plays a larger role for minorities sorting into performance pay than for whites. Thus, if we anticipate that unobservable measures of ability are correlated with observed measures, the pattern of sorting is consistent with high ability minorities sorting into performance pay jobs and consistent with the fixed effect estimates being smaller than the pooled estimates. While minorities earn more from being in performance pay jobs than whites, this partially reflects that high ability minorities disproportionately appear in performance pay jobs. This contrasts with the finding from the US that high ability blacks sort out of performance pay jobs.
Conclusions
Performance pay is thought to more closely link worker productivity and earnings.
We have explored how performance pay influences the size of the measured ethnic earnings differential. We are, to our knowledge, the first to do this using data from Britain.
We show that in pooled estimates performance pay is associated with a smaller average ethnic wage differential. This is driven by a smaller ethnic differential for those receiving bonuses. This pattern of results remains in fixed effect estimates but the size of the influence is smaller than in the OLS suggesting sorting. Asians and Black ethnicities present a contrasting pattern in pooled estimates but that contrast does not carry-over to the fixed effect estimates.
The quantile estimates suggest that the tendency of bonuses to shrink ethnic wage differentials is concentrated at the top (or upper middle) of the earnings distribution. It is here that the return to performance pay is significantly larger for ethnic minorities. This general finding is seemingly robust and carries over to quantile estimates holding constant the time-invariant individual characteristics. The descriptive estimates suggest that high ability minorities (using the observables) are disproportionately sorting into the performance pay sector. If the unobservables are correlated with the observables, the fixed effect estimates are consistent with sorting on unobserved ability. Thus, ethnic minorities may anticipate that they will more likely be able to reveal this unobserved (to the researcher) ability and be rewarded for it in the performance pay sector. Each entry is the percentage of workers in that decile who report receiving PRP and bonuses. As the categories are not mutually exclusive the combined measure is the percentage who report either one or both methods of pay. Estimates are derived from Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regressions with controls as per Table 4 . Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
